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Executive compensation and cash contributions to defined benefit pension plans 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the impact of managerial incentives on companies’ contributions to 
their defined benefit pension (DB) plans. In particular, we investigate whether firms with higher CEO 
compensation contribute less to DB plans. The motivation for this research question is two-fold. First, 
in the United States, the funding status of DB plans and companies’ abilities to contribute to their 
pension plans have decreased significantly over the last couple of decades. This is due to an 
unprecedented number of corporate bankruptcies and has dramatically increased the financial burden 
of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).1, 2 For example, on July 23, 2009, the PBGC 
agreed to take on $6.2 billion of pension liabilities from Delphi Corporation, a bankrupt auto supplier. 
This is just one of the companies the PBGC recently assumed responsibilities from. Other notable 
examples include Lehman Brothers and Circuit City. Because of these and subsequent events (e.g., 
lackluster pension asset returns and low interest rates), as of September 30, 2015, the PBGC had a 
deficit of $76.35 billion, almost seven times the deficit as of September 30, 2008. If in the long run 
the PBGC does not have sufficient funding to cover its obligations, (1) Congress will have to increase 
the premium paid by all companies with DB plans, (2) the government, and ultimately taxpayers, will 
have to bail the PBGC out, and/or (3) insured participants will suffer the losses. As such, it is 
important to understand companies’ funding decisions relating to their DB plans. 
Second, under the current accounting rules, a contribution to a DB plan is simply a transfer on 
the balance sheet, from cash to net pension asset/liability. A DB plan contribution has no direct 
impact on current year’s net income, but it reduces cash flows from operations. Several recent studies 
demonstrate an increased demand for information relating to firms’ cash flows from operations (e.g., 
                                                     
1 Under a DB plan, the retirement benefit that an employee will receive is a function of the employee’s years of 
service and compensation level in the years approaching retirement. Companies make periodic contributions to 
pension plans to ensure there are enough assets to cover the promised future benefits. 
2 The PBGC is a federal corporation that insures the retirement future of nearly 44 million people in over 26,000 
private sector DB plans (www.pbgc.gov). In the event that a company goes bankrupt and does not have 
sufficient assets to cover its pension obligations, the PBGC will provide the retirement benefits to the 
participants of the plan. The PBGC’s main income source is the premium paid by all companies with insured 
DB plans. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3205985 
 
3 
 
DeFond and Hung 2003; Givoly et al. 2009) and the adverse consequences of missing analysts’ cash 
flow forecasts (e.g., Edmonds et al. 2011; McInnis and Collins 2011). As such, the board of directors 
and shareholders likely incentivize CEOs to increase reported cash flows from operations by 
rewarding CEOs reporting higher cash flows from operations with higher compensation. As a result, 
we argue that managers likely delay pension contributions when they can personally benefit by 
receiving higher compensation from reporting higher cash flows from operations.  
Despite its importance, there is limited research on companies’ contribution decisions of DB 
plans, and to our knowledge, there is no research on how managerial incentives affect DB plan 
contributions. This is largely attributed to the fact that most DB plans in the United States were well 
funded in the 1980s and 1990s, thanks to the high returns from pension assets and high interest rates 
during that period. After the burst of the Internet bubble in 2000 and 2001, the returns from pension 
assets were lowered, leading to lower pension assets. During the same period, interest rates decreased, 
resulting in increased pension obligations. The recent financial crisis has exacerbated the problem. In 
the period 2001-2012, 70-95% of DB plans were underfunded, up from around 30% in the late 1980s 
and 40% in the 1990s, as shown in Panel A of Figure 1. Panel B of Figure 1 shows that the magnitude 
of unfunded pension obligations has also increased from roughly zero in the 1980s and 1990s to over 
$600 billion for S&P500 firms and over $1.1 trillion for the Compustat population in 2012.  
Another reason for the lack of research on the contribution decision is data availability. The 
contribution data reported in Compustat and the pension footnotes to the annual reports often do not 
separate contributions to DB plans from those to defined contribution plans. We solve this problem by 
obtaining DB plan contribution data from companies’ Form 5500 filings with the Internal Revenue 
Service. 
A firm’s decision to contribute to a DB plan reflects the current period trade-off between the 
benefit, increasing pension assets and reducing the net pension liabilities for underfunded DB plans, 
and the cost, reducing cash flows from operations and cash available for other purposes. Prior 
research shows that cash flows from operations are an important determinant of CEO compensation 
(e.g., Nwaeze et al. 2006). We predict that managers have incentives to contribute less to DB plans in 
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order to report higher cash flows from operations and increase managers’ compensation.3 However, 
delaying DB plan contributions leads to higher net pension liabilities in the current period, which in 
turn leads to higher pension expenses and lower net income in the future periods. 4 Lower net income 
in the future can lead to lower compensation in the future. Thus, whether executive compensation 
considerations affect pension contributions is an empirical question.  
Our initial sample consists of 5,221 firm-year observations from S&P1500 firms in the period 
1994-2007 (the data on DB pension contributions ends in 2007). Consistent with our prediction, we 
find a negative association between pension contributions and CEO compensation. Firms with higher 
CEO compensation contribute less to pension plans, indicating that managers likely seek personal 
benefits at the expense of employees’ retirement benefits.  
Since the argument for managers to delay pension contributions in order to report higher cash 
flows from operations rests on the importance of cash flows from operations for CEO compensation, 
within our initial sample, we use two approaches to identify a group of firms, for which cash flows 
from operations is an important determinant of CEO compensation. First, we identify a subsample of 
firms that explicitly mention cash flows from operations when discussing CEO compensation in their 
proxy statements. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the negative association between 
executive compensation and pension contributions is more pronounced for these firms than for other 
firms. Second, we estimate the sensitivity of CEO compensation to cash flows from operations, 
controlling for income before extraordinary items and annual returns, and then use this sensitivity to 
capture the importance of cash flows from operations for CEO compensation. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find a more negative association between executive compensation and pension 
contributions when compensation is more sensitive to cash flows from operations. Taken together, 
                                                     
3 One key assumption is that various stakeholders do not expect managers to delay contributions to report higher 
cash flows from operations. Even if these stakeholders do and react accordingly, the model in Stein (1989) 
implies that in equilibrium managers still delay pension contributions and report higher cash flows from 
operations. When outsiders think reported cash flows from operations are higher due to lower pension 
contributions, they will “discount” reported cash flows from operations. To offset this discount, managers 
reduce pension contributions and report higher cash flows from operations. 
4 Contributions to DB plans increase pension assets. Under the current accounting standards, the expected return 
(not the actual return) from the beginning-of-period pension assets reduces pension expense. Thus, cash 
contributions to pension assets reduce pension expense in the future period by the expected return from such 
contribution.  
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these results support our prediction that firms are more likely to delay DB plan contributions when 
cash flows from operations are more important for CEO compensation. 
We perform a number of additional analyses to enrich our analyses and to provide additional 
insights. First, we split CEO compensation into cash compensation and non-cash compensation and 
find both components contribute to the negative association between CEO compensation and pension 
contributions in the sub-samples of firms identified where cash flows from operations are an 
important metric in CEO compensation.  
Second, in this paper we argue that managers have incentives to delay pension contributions in 
order to report higher cash flows from operations and ultimately to increase their compensation. To 
reinforce our inferences, in an additional analysis, we explicitly examine whether delaying pension 
contributions increases CEO compensation. Whether using total contributions or abnormal pension 
contributions, the difference between actual pension contributions and the component explained by 
economic factors, we find that firms contributing less to pension plans indeed have higher CEO 
compensation. The impact is also economically significant – a one-standard deviation decrease in 
contributions (abnormal pension contributions) is associated with a 3.4% (2.4%) increase in total 
compensation. 
Lastly, we explore whether firms behave differently under different accounting regimes. 
Compared to earlier accounting rules on DB plans, SFAS 158 requires the recognition of the funded 
status on the balance sheet. If the explicit recognition of net pension liabilities helps outsiders to 
recognize the adverse consequences of not contributing to DB plans, we expect to observe weaker 
results under SFAS 158. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that the effect of CEO compensation 
on DB plan contribution is insignificant under the most recent accounting regime. These findings 
suggest that the recognition of pension assets/liabilities under the more recent accounting regime 
allows users of financial statements to better understand the funded status of DB plans and this in turn 
affects firms’ contribution decisions, however, we interpret this result with caution due to the small 
number of observations in the post SFAS 158 period. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, our paper is the first to 
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study how executive compensation influences firms’ decisions to contribute to DB plans. Much of 
prior literature examines how compensation contracts encourage managers to engage in real earnings 
management (e.g., Roychowdhury 2006; Hunton et al. 2008). However, unlike real earnings 
management, contributions to DB plans do not impact current period’s earnings directly.  
Second, our paper contributes to the literature on managerial incentives to report higher cash 
flows from operations. We provide evidence that firms delay contributions to report higher cash flows 
from operations when reported cash flows from operations are important in influencing CEO 
compensation. Our paper is related to, but different from, two recent studies that examine managers’ 
incentives to report higher cash flows from operations, Lee (2012) and Frankel et al. (2015). They 
find that managers report higher operating cash flows by reducing non-cash working capital in the 
fourth quarter. Our study is different from these two studies in several important dimensions. 
Delaying contributions to DB plans affects pension assets and pension liabilities, which are recorded 
as long-term assets and liabilities, respectively (pension contributions only affect working capital if a 
current liability is recorded for the pension benefits to be paid in the next 12 months). Therefore, our 
study suggests a different type of cash flow management. In addition, Lee (2012) and Frankel et al. 
(2015) find that working capital increases significantly in the first quarter following a decrease in the 
previous fourth quarter. Because working capital includes assets and liabilities needed for operating 
purposes, this finding suggests a temporary delay in operating cash flow. In contrast, DB plan 
contributions are not needed for operating purposes and could be delayed over multiple periods, 
resulting in severely underfunded DB plans.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature that uses pension contributions as an exogenous 
shock to study how financial constraints affect firms’ investment decisions (Rauh 2006; Franzoni 
2009). These studies find that required pension contributions adversely affect firms’ ability to invest. 
In contrast, Bakke and Whited (2012) find that if pension contributions are endogenous, pension 
contributions do not affect firms’ investment decisions. The findings in our study indicate that pension 
contributions are anything but exogenous. A more balanced view will be that pension contributions 
and investment/financing decisions are jointly determined. This view is consistent with recent 
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research documenting that as the level of underfunding increases, firms are more likely to engage in 
overinvestment (Chaudhry, Yong, and Veld 2017).  
Fourth, numerous mechanisms are in place to encourage companies to contribute to DB plans in 
an effort to increase the number of well-funded DB plans (see Appendix B for further discussion). For 
example, firms with DB plans that do not meet minimum funding requirements are required to pay 
interest charges and liens. Firms may face political costs and public scrutiny if their DB plans are 
labeled high risk by the PBGC. However, research has highlighted the flexibility management has in 
the contribution decision suggesting these mechanisms may not be binding (Chaudhry, Yong, and 
Veld 2017). Therefore, our analyses add to the literature that speaks to the effectiveness of these 
mechanisms put in place by regulators and the PBGC (Guan and Lui 2016). 
Although the use of defined benefit pension plans has decreased over time in the United States, 
our results speak to a much broader international audience. DB plans are prevalent in almost all 
developed countries and many developing countries. In fact, in 2016 DB plans can be found in 27 out 
of 36 countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and have 
over $38 trillion USD investment in private pension assets.5 Thus it is important to understand the 
factors that influence firms’ DB plan contribution decisions.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 discusses the related literature and 
develops the hypothesis. Section 3 presents our sample and variable measurements. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical analyses, and Section 5 reports additional analyses. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Below we first discuss prior research related to our study. We then discuss how managerial 
incentives affect pension contributions and develop our hypothesis along the way.  
2.1 A review of the related literature 
This paper is related to two lines of pension research: how managerial incentives affect pension 
assumptions and what factors determine the funded status of pension plans. The majority of the 
                                                     
5 http://www.oecd.org/pensions/private-pensions/Pension-Markets-in-Focus-2017.pdf. 
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accounting literature on pension plans focuses on the determinants of pension assumptions (e.g., 
interest rate and investment rate of return) and whether managers exploit their discretion to influence 
the numbers reported in financial statements.6 For example, Godwin et al. (1996) find that firms 
change the interest rate assumption to increase earnings and reduce leverage. Asthana (1999) finds 
that firms change pension assumptions to smooth the funded status using conservative (aggressive) 
pension assumptions when plans are overfunded (underfunded). Comprix and Muller (2006) find that 
firms use higher expected rate of returns for pension assets to increase reported earnings in order to 
increase executive compensation. Billings et al. (2016) provide international evidence that UK 
companies exploit discretion in actuarial assumptions, particularly when the pension plan funding 
positions are weak. Sithole et al. (2011) observe systematic differences across countries in life 
expectancy assumptions as inputs to pension liabilities calculations. Interestingly, Hann et al. (2007) 
find that the discretion in pension assumptions does not seem to affect the value relevance of pension 
obligations.7  
A few prior studies examine the determinants of the funded status of DB plans. Prior research 
finds that the funded status is affected by both firm characteristics and pension plan characteristics 
(e.g., Ippolito 1985; Bodie et al. 1987; Francis and Reiter 1987; Thomas 1988). Bodie et al. (1987) 
and Ippolito (1985) examine the impact of capital availability, firm performance, and tax rates on the 
funded status. Thomas (1988) finds that tax status is a determinant of funded status, along with 
actuarial variables and the use of defined benefit plans. Francis and Reiter (1987) find that the funded 
status is positively related to tax incentives and capital availability, negatively related to benefits per 
employee and the presence of a labor union, and unrelated to firm size, leverage, profitability, plan 
maturity, and return volatility. More recently, Begley, Chamberlain, Yang, and Zhang (2015) find that 
when CEOs have a larger interest in the employee DB pension plan relative to their other wealth in 
the firm, the DB pension plans are better funded. 
Our paper extends this line of research on two important dimensions. First, our paper focuses on 
                                                     
6 There is a line of research examining the termination/settlement of overfunded DB plans. See Hamdallah and 
Ruland (1986), Stone (1987), Thomas (1989), Stone (1991), Haw and Jung (1991), and Cole and Sommer 
(2005) for examples on the termination/settlement of overfunded DB plans.  
7 See Glaum (2009) for a review of empirical research on pension accounting. 
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DB plan contributions rather than on the funded status of DB plans. Unlike the funded status strategy, 
which has a longer-term focus, contributions are more likely to be affected by the current period’s 
incentives. In addition, prior studies of the funded status mainly use data from the 1980s. Unlike many 
of these studies, our paper uses more recent data (1994-2007) and focuses on a period when many DB 
plans are underfunded, as discussed earlier. It is clear that the environment in which firms operate has 
changed substantially since the 1980s, and thus it is important to understand what determines firms’ 
decisions to contribute to pension plans in the current environment. 
Second and more importantly, in this paper we examine how executive compensation 
influences pension contributions. By analyzing the impact of managerial incentives on pension 
contributions, we highlight managers’ discretion in pension contributions, which is not well 
understood. To our best knowledge, there is no study that systematically examines the impact of 
managerial incentives on contributions to DB plans. Unlike pension assumptions (e.g., interest rate, 
rate of return on pension assets), contributions to DB plans affect income in future periods, because 
the expected returns from pension assets reduce pension expense and increase net income, and do not 
directly affect current period net income.8 Thus examining cash contributions to DB plans presents a 
unique opportunity to test managers’ incentives to report higher cash flows from operations in the 
current period, without the confounding effect of earnings management. Cash flows from operations 
has become an important performance metric used by the capital markets, and as a result, we have 
seen an increase in analysts’ forecasts of cash flows from operations (i.e., DeFond and Hung 2003; 
Wasley and Wu 2006; Givoly, Hayn, and Lehavy 2009) and the use of cash flow information in 
compensation contracts (Nwaeze et al. 2006; Frankel et al. 2015). Given the importance of cash flows 
from operations, managers likely have incentives to delay contributions to report higher cash flows 
from operations for personal gains. We study one setting in which managers’ incentive to report 
higher cash flows from operations affects real economic decisions, resulting in severe consequences 
for the future welfare of the employees.  
                                                     
8 Prior to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 becoming effective in 1986, pension 
contributions reduced net income. Under the accounting rules in our sample period, pension contributions do not 
affect the current year’s net income, because expected returns, which impact current period’s pension expense, 
are calculated based on beginning-of-period pension assets and are not affected by current period contributions. 
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2.2 Hypothesis development  
In a DB plan, an employer commits to paying a specified amount of future benefit to its 
employees upon their retirement. The specified future benefit is in essence a form of deferred 
compensation. The employer is responsible for determining how much to contribute to the DB plan 
and how to invest pension assets in order to meet future pension obligations. If the present value of 
future obligations is higher (lower) than the fair value of pension assets, the plan is considered 
underfunded (overfunded). Contributing to a DB plan has two important implications for a company’s 
financial situation. First, all else equal, contributions reduce the net pension obligation, which is a 
liability for underfunded DB plans, and thus reduce the overall liabilities and risk of the company. 
Second, contributions reduce cash flows from operations and cash available for other purposes. 
Therefore, the funding decision reflects the trade-off between the benefit – reducing the net pension 
obligation, and the cost – reducing cash flows from operations and cash available for other purposes. 
In this section, we discuss how DB plan contributions can be affected by executive compensation 
consideration. 
Prior research finds a positive association between firm performance and CEO compensation 
(e.g., Core et al. 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001; Matsunaga and Park 2001; Garvey and 
Milbourn 2006; Nwaeze et al. 2006). Although most papers use accounting earnings and stock returns 
to measure firm performance, recent studies find an increasing use of cash flows from operations as a 
performance metric (i.e. DeFond and Hung 2003; Wasley and Wu 2006; Givoly, Hayn, and Lehavy 
2009).  
Because cash flows from operations are an important metric used in firm valuation, boards of 
directors and shareholders may incentivize CEOs to increase cash flows from operations by using 
cash flow from operations as performance metrics in compensation contracts. Indeed, Nwaeze et al. 
(2006) find that many companies explicitly link executive compensation to cash flows from 
operations. They document that CEO cash compensation is positively correlated with 
contemporaneous cash flows from operations, particularly when the informativeness of earnings is 
low. Frankel et al. (2015) further document that executive compensation in the form of cash bonuses 
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motivates companies to reduce non-cash working capital in the fourth fiscal quarter in order to report 
higher cash flows from operations. While not tabulated, we confirm the positive association between 
cash compensation and cash flows from operations. In addition, we find that cash flows from 
operations is also a performance metric considered by many firms when determining noncash 
compensation components such as restricted stock and stock options (see proxy statements for 
Anheuser-Busch Company, Bard Inc., Barnes Group Inc., among other firms).  
If managers expect that outsiders cannot effectively distinguish between higher cash flows from 
operations arising from better performance and those from reduced pension contributions, managers 
might reduce pension contributions in an effort to increase cash flows from operations and their 
compensation.9 Executives will have stronger incentives to delay pension contributions and report 
higher cash flows from operations if cash flows from operations are more important in determining 
their compensation. Thus, when the sensitivity of executive compensation to cash flows from 
operations is higher, managers have stronger incentives to report higher cash flows from operations, 
and might be more likely to resort to delaying pension contributions for this purpose. By delaying DB 
plan contributions, cash flows from operations will be higher, increasing CEO compensation. Based 
on this discussion, we predict that contributions to DB plans to be negatively correlated with CEO 
compensation, especially when CEO compensation is linked to cash flows from operations. 
However, as discussed above, one consequence of contributing less to pension plans is that 
pension assets are lower. Since the expected returns from pension assets reduce pension expense and 
increase net income, contributing less in the current year will lead to higher pension expense and 
lower net income in the next year. Given that net income is also an important determinant of 
compensation, contributing less to DB pension plans might lead to lower compensation in the next 
year via its effect on future net income.10 Thus, managers face the trade-off between higher cash flows 
                                                     
9 It is possible that outsiders can distinguish between higher cash flows from operations arising from better 
performance and those from reduced pension contributions, but shareholders and managers might prefer reduced 
pension contributions because it results in a wealth transfer from employees to shareholders. 
10 Focusing on pension income and expenses, Comprix and Muller (2006) find that managers strategically 
choose a higher expected rate of return on pension assets to report higher pension income and to increase their 
compensation. They also find that CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to pension expense than pension 
income, suggesting that managers are shielded from pension expense amounts. 
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from operations (and higher compensation) in the current year and lower net income (and lower 
compensation) in the future. If the effect on total CEO compensation of the decrease in future net 
income dominates that of the increase in cash flows from operations in the current year, we will not 
find results consistent with our hypothesis.  
 
3. Sample and Variable Measurements 
3.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of 5,221 firm-year observations in the S&P 1500 index over the 
period 1994 to 2007 that have required data from Compustat and the Form 5500-CRR database.11 We 
start with 12,147 firm-year observations that have the necessary pension data from Compustat, such 
as pension assets and pension benefit obligations (PBO). We exclude 4,954 firm-year observations 
due to missing data from the Form 5500-CRR database.12,13 Pension contributions as reported in 
Compustat include the contributions to both defined benefit and defined contribution plans for firms 
with both types of plans. Because we are interested in contributions to DB plans, we obtain 
contributions to individual DB plans, as reported in Form 5500, and aggregate the contributions at the 
firm level. We also lose 1,428 and 544 observations due to missing information on other required data 
obtained from Compustat and ExecuComp, respectively. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample 
selection process. 
                                                     
11 We start with 1994 because this is the first year when Compustat provides historical S&P1500 index 
constituents and stop at 2007 because this is the last year we have data on pension contributions.  
12 Form 5500 is filed with the Department of Labor by each private pension plan sponsor with more than 100 
plan participants. Please see the Department of Labor website (http://www.dol.gov/) for more detailed 
information about Form 5500. We obtained the form 5500 data from the Center for Retirement Research (CRR) 
at Boston College. The Form 5500-CRR database contains data at the plan level relating to the main form, 
schedule B (actuarial information), schedule H (financial information), and schedule T (pension coverage 
information). For firms with multiple plans, we collect data for individual plans and then aggregate information 
across plans, requiring plan year-ends within six months prior to the firm’s fiscal year end and within five 
months after the firm’s fiscal year end. We obtain similar results if we restrict the sample to plans that have 
fiscal year ends within the three-month period centering on the firm’s fiscal year end. Separately, controlling for 
the number of plans in the regression does not affect the results. 
13 The loss of the large number of observations with data missing from Form 5500 is mainly due to two factors. 
First, Form 5500 is only filed for plans with more than 100 plan participants. Therefore, firms that only have 
plans with 100 or fewer participants are excluded. Second, firm identification information available on Form 
5500 is the Employee Identification Number (EIN) and firm name. Therefore, we match Compustat data with 
Form 5500 data based on EIN and/or firm name. Observations that we cannot find matched data from Form 
5500 are dropped. Largely because of the first reason, observations in our final sample are larger (measured by 
market value of equity, sales, net income, and plan assets) compared to the Compustat population.  
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Table 1, Panel B provides sample composition by year. The number of observations per year 
range from 276 in 1994 to 476 in 1997, with the average number of observations per year being 373. 
Although there does not appear to be any year clustering, in the main analyses, we include year fixed 
effects to control for cross-sectional variation in firm contributions over time.  
Panel C of Table 1 presents the sample distribution across the Fama-French industries. The 
industries with the largest representation include Business Supplies (4.81%), Chemicals (7.45%), 
Machinery (6.65%), Petroleum and Natural Gas (5.32%), Retail (4.77%), and Utilities (10.00%). 
Compared to firms in the S&P 1500 index as of December 31, 2006, our sample firms are over-
represented in these industries with the exception of Retail and are under-represented in Business 
Services, Electronic Equipment, and Insurance. We include industry dummies to control for industry 
fixed effects.14, 15 
3.2 Variable measurements  
Appendix A provides a detailed description of variable measurements. Pension contribution 
(Contribution) is calculated as the total contributions to all DB plans for a firm-year, scaled by total 
assets and then multiplied by 100.16,17  
We measure executive compensation using CEO total compensation (CEO_Compensation). To 
reduce the impact of extreme values, we use the natural logarithm of CEO compensation. We predict 
a negative coefficient on this variable when explaining contributions to DB plans. As discussed in 
Section 4, inferences remain the same when we use CEO compensation scaled by total assets. 
Prior research suggests that many other factors determine pension contributions: prior year’s 
funded status, minimum contribution requirement, collective bargain agreement, average retirement 
                                                     
14 Overtime the government has exempted some firms and some industries that face financial difficulties from 
the contribution requirement. The rules change over time depending on the economic condition and the hardship 
industries experienced.  
15 An alternative to industry fixed effects is to include firm fixed effects. Results (untabulated) are not robust to 
introducing firm fixed effects, indicating that most of the variation in the observed relations is between firms, 
not within years per firm. 
16 While some firms contribute to DB plans with their own stocks, we only include cash contributions to DB 
plans. Non-cash contributions do not affect cash flows from operations. 
17 Because we are interested in the current period contribution decision, we scale Contribution by total assets 
instead of PBO. PBO is a measure of future pension obligations to retirees. Scaling pension contributions by 
PBO relates more to the funding decision (Anantharaman and Lee 2014) and steers away from the focus on the 
contribution decision in the current period, which better relates to our primary research question. 
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benefit, percentage of retired participants, other needs for cash, interest coverage, distress risk, 
marginal tax rate, firm performance, firm size, market to book ratio, annual market return, average T-
bond rate, and standard deviation of returns from pension assets. To save space, we discuss why these 
variables explain pension contributions in Appendix B.  
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the variables used in the analyses. As 
indicated in the table, at least a quarter of the sample makes no contributions to their DB plans 
although most firm-year observations have a non-zero minimum required contribution. A staggering 
72.8% of the sample, or 3,082 firm-year observations, have contributions lower than the minimum 
required contribution (untabulated). The minimum required contribution, as specified in Section 430 
of the Internal Revenue Code, is determined based on normal cost, amortization charges and credits, 
and interest. Firms that do not meet their plan’s minimum funding requirement pay interest charges 
and liens. These discussions indicate that the minimum funding requirement is not considered a 
“requirement” by firms and is not binding. In the current environment, this suggests that the interest 
charges and liens are not substantial enough to incentivize firms to meet the minimum funding 
requirement.18  
The average CEO compensation is about $5 million (not tabulated). About 65% of firm-year 
observations have underfunded DB plans and 46% of firm-year observations have a collective 
bargaining unit. All other variables appear reasonable given the sample composition of S&P 1500 
firms.  
Panel B of Table 2 contains the correlation matrix for the variables used in the regression 
analysis. None of the main independent variables appear to be highly correlated with each other, 
except UnderFunding and Underfunding_Dum, Inv_CF and Fin_CF, Z_Score and 
1/Interest_Coverage, ROA and 1/Interest Coverage, ROA and Z_Score, Z_Score and Market_Book, 
ROA and Market_Book, and Firm_Size and CEO_Compensation. An analysis of variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) suggests that multicollinearity is not an issue; VIFs on our independent variables 
                                                     
18 This is consistent with the finding in Ippolito (1988) that the underfunded union DB pensions did not enhance 
funding levels in the post-ERISA period when minimum funding rules became effective. 
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ranges from 1.08 to 4.58 and the mean VIF for all independent variables is 2.00. 
 
4. Main Empirical Analyses 
4.1 The base model: Economic determinants 
Before presenting results on our hypothesis, we first present results from the base model, when 
only economic determinants are included. The main motivation for this test is that no prior study 
examines a comprehensive list of the determinants of pension contributions, especially in a recent 
time period. Thus, it is important to document their impact on pension contributions in the current 
economic environment. For this purpose, we regress pension contributions on plan characteristics, 
firm characteristics and other control variables, as identified in Appendix B, using the following 
regression specification: 
Contribution = α0 + β1 UnderFunding+ β2 UnderFunding_Dum+ β3 Min_Contribution  
+ β4 Collective_Bargain + β5 Benefit_Ave+ β6 PercRetired  
+ β7 Op_CF + β8 Inv_CF + β9 Fin_CF + β10 1/Interest_Coverage  
+ β11 Z_Score+ β12 MTR + β13 ROA+ β14 Firm_Size + β15 Market_Book  
+ β16 Annual_Mkt_Ret + β17 Average_Tbond + β18 Devpensionret  
+ Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + ε 
 
Note that we use contribution, not excess contribution (contribution minus minimum required 
contribution), as the dependent variable because as discussed above, minimum required contribution 
is not binding; many firms contribute less than the minimum required contribution. In addition, using 
the excess contribution as the dependent variable implicitly assumes that the coefficient on 
Min_Contribution is one; such a regression is a special case of regression (1).  See Appendix A for 
variable definitions and predicted signs. All independent variables are measured contemporaneously, 
with the exception of funded status, which is lagged. To mitigate the influence of extreme values, we 
winsorize independent variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles and exclude observations with R-
student values greater than 3. To control for the potential correlations between observations of the 
same firm or between observations in the same year, we use firm-clustering-adjusted standard errors 
to calculate p-values. We include industry and year dummies in the regression to control for industry 
and year fixed effects, respectively. 
Table 3 reports the regression results. As predicted, firms contribute more to DB plans when the 
(1) 
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level of underfunding and the minimum contribution requirement are higher or when the plan is 
underfunded. The coefficients on UnderFunding, UnderFunding_Dum and Min_Contribution are 
significantly positive (p<0.001). Note that that the coefficient on Min_Contribution is significantly 
smaller than 1 (p-value <= 0.001), again indicating that minimum required contribution is not binding. 
Average employee pension benefit (Benefit_Ave) is negatively correlated with Contribution, 
indicating that firms contribute less when the average retirement benefit is high. The percentage of 
total plan participants that are retired relates negatively to Contribution, supporting the bonding 
mechanism viewpoint. As expected, the coefficients on Op_CF, Inv_CF, Fin_CF and Z_Score are 
significantly positive. These results suggest that pension contributions are higher for firms with more 
cash flow available and lower distress risk, consistent with the notion that the opportunity cost of 
pension contributions is lower for these firms than for other firms. We also find that firms contribute 
more when they are larger and contribute less when the annual market return is high. Interest 
coverage, marginal tax rate, profitability, market to book, treasury bond rate, and the variability of 
pension assets have insignificant impacts on pension contributions.  
Overall, these results indicate that plan and firm characteristics significantly affect firms’ 
propensity to contribute to DB plans and are consistent with the trade-off between the benefits and 
costs of pension contributions.  
4.2 CEO Compensation and pension contributions  
To test our hypothesis, we add CEO compensation to the base model from Section 4.1: 
Contribution = α0 + α1CEO_Compensation + β1 UnderFunding 
+ β2 UnderFunding_Dum+ β3 Min_Contribution  
+ β4 Collective_Bargain + β5 Benefit_Ave+ β6 PercRetired  
+ β7 Op_CF + β8 Inv_CF + β9 Fin_CF  
+ β10 1/Interest_Coverage + β11 Z_Score 
+ β12 MTR + β13 ROA+ β14 Firm_Size + β15 Market_Book 
+ β16 Annual_Mkt_Ret + β17 Average_Tbond + β18 Devpensionret  
+ Industry Dummies + Year Dummies + ε 
 
Our hypothesis predicts contributions to DB plans to be negatively correlated with CEO 
compensation. Column (2) of Table 3 reports the regression results. Overall, the results are consistent 
with our hypothesis. The coefficient on CEO_Compensation is significantly negative (p-value=0.028), 
suggesting that firms with high CEO compensation contribute less to their DB plans. Our 
(2) 
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interpretation of the results is that managers contribute less to DB plans in order to report positive 
cash flows from operations, making performance appear to be more favorable and increasing their 
own compensation. If this is the case, then the results suggest a wealth transfer from employees to top 
executives.  
However, our motivation for our hypothesis assumes that cash flows from operations are 
important in determining executive compensation. That is, when the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to cash flows from operations is higher, managers have stronger incentives to report 
higher cash flows from operations and are thus more likely to resort to delaying pension contributions 
for this purpose. Therefore, to more directly test our hypothesis, we use two different approaches to 
identify firm observations where cash flows from operations impacts executive compensation. First, 
we identify firms that mention cash flows from operations in the design of CEO compensation. 
Second, we estimate the sensitivity of CEO compensation to cash flows from operations. These two 
approaches complement each other and have their own limitations. The first approach does not 
provide any quantitative statement and the detail of disclosure varies across firms (e.g., how important 
cash flows from operations are) and the estimated sensitivity based on the second approach contains 
measurement error. Thus, obtaining similar results increases our confidence in the inferences.   
CEO compensation directly linked to cash flows from operations 
Reported cash flows from operations is important to CEO compensation when it is used in the 
design of CEO compensation. To identify firms that link CEO compensation to cash flows from 
operations, we search each firm’s proxy statements and hand collect data related to factors that 
influence CEO compensation. Of our initial sample of 5,221 observations, we eliminate 291 
observations with missing proxy compensation data. We further split the remaining sample of 4,930 
observations into two sub-samples: firm-year observations with proxy statements that explicitly state 
that cash flows from operations may influence CEO compensation (n = 1,535), and all other firm-year 
observations (n = 3,395). We then estimate equation (2) separately for these two sub-samples and test 
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whether the coefficient on CEO_Compensation differs across the two sub-samples.19  
Table 4 Panel A presents the results, Column (1) for the subsample with cash flows from 
operations influencing total compensation, Column (2) for the other subsample, and Column (3) for 
the differences between the two. Although we find that CEO_Compensation is significantly 
negatively related to DB plan contributions in both sub-samples, we find that the coefficient on 
CEO_Compensation is marginally significantly more negative (p-value = 0.088) for the subsample of 
firm-year observations with cash flows from operations influencing total compensation than for the 
other subsample.  
CEO compensation sensitivity to cash flows from operations 
Another way to measure the importance of reported cash flows from operations for CEO 
compensation is the sensitivity of CEO compensation to cash flows from operations. To do this, for 
each firm, we regress the percentage change in CEO total compensation from year t-1 to year t on the 
contemporaneous percentage change in cash flows from operations, as well as the contemporaneous 
percentage change in income before extraordinary items and in annual returns, the two factors that 
have been shown to affect CEO compensation (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan 
2001; Matsunaga and Park 2001; Garvey and Milbourn 2006; Nwaeze et al. 2006). A positive 
coefficient on the percentage change in cash flows from operations indicates that the change in CEO 
compensation is sensitive to cash flows from operations. We predict that when CEO compensation is 
more sensitive to the change in cash flows from operations, managers have stronger incentives to 
report higher cash flows from operations and are more likely to delay pension contributions for this 
purpose.  
To test this prediction, we split our sample of observations with data available to calculate 
compensation sensitivity into two subsamples: firm-year observations where the coefficient on the 
percentage change in cash flows from operations is positive (n = 2,715) and firm-year observations 
                                                     
19 As discussed at the beginning of Section 4.2, the level of detail of factors that influence CEO compensation in 
the proxy statements varies drastically across firms. Also, a number of firms mention possible performance 
metrics that may affect CEO compensation. If cash flows from operations is mentioned as a possible 
performance metric, the observations are included in the sub-sample in which the proxy statement explicitly 
states that cash flows from operations may influence CEO compensation. 
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where the coefficient on the percentage change in cash flows from operations is negative (n = 2,194). 
We then estimate Equation (2) separately for these two sub-samples and test whether the coefficient 
on CEO_Compensation differs between the two subsamples. Table 4 Panel B presents the results, 
Column (1) for the subsample with positive coefficient on the percentage change in cash flows from 
operations and Column (2) for the other subsample. The differences between the two subsamples are 
presented in the last column. We find that CEO_Compensation is significantly negatively related to 
DB plan contributions only in the sub-sample of observations with positive CEO compensation-cash 
flow sensitivity. Furthermore, we find the difference in the coefficient on CEO_Compensation 
between the two subsamples is significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.022. 
Overall the results in Table 4 indicates that, consistent with our prediction, firms are more likely 
to delay DB plan contributions when the sensitivity of executive compensation to cash flows from 
operations is higher. These results are consistent with those reported on the larger sample in Table 3 
Column (2). As discussed above, we recognize that both proxies are not perfect and contain noise, but 
despite these limitations, observing similar results from these two sets of analyses increases our 
confidence in the results.20, 21 
4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
We conduct several sensitivity tests to investigate the robustness of the results. First, in an 
                                                     
20 Cash flows from operations can also affect CEO compensation indirectly via its impact on firm valuation. 
Therefore, we expect the results to be stronger in instances when cash flows from operations are a more 
important measure of firm performance. Several recent studies argue that analysts provide cash flow forecasts 
when cash flows from operations is an important measure of firm performance and when earnings are less 
informative (DeFond and Hung 2003; Graham et al. 2005; Call et al. 2009). Thus, we expect our results to be 
stronger for firms with analyst cash flow forecasts than for firms without analyst cash flow forecasts. In an 
untabulated test, we test this prediction by splitting our sample into two subsamples: firm-year observations for 
which analyst cash flow forecasts exist in I/B/E/S and all other firm-year observations. We estimate Equation 
(2) for these two sub-samples and test whether the coefficient on CEO_Compensation differs across the two 
sub-samples. We find that the coefficient on CEO_Compensation is negative in both subsamples but only 
significantly negative in the subsample of firms with cash flows from operations forecasts, indicating that 
managers are more likely to delay contributions to defined benefit plans when cash flows from operations are an 
important measure of firm performance. The difference in the coefficient on CEO_Compensation between the 
two subsamples is not significantly different from zero. 
21 As Figure 1 shows, the number of underfunded plans significantly increased after 2000. In untabulated tests, 
we test our results in the post 2000 sample period. We find the coefficient on CEO_Compensation to be 
significantly negative in both the subsample with cash flows from operations being used in compensation 
contracts (coefficient = -0.048 and p-value = 0.073) and the subsample with positive compensation to cash flow 
sensitivity (coefficient = -0.055 and p-value = 0.022). The slightly weaker results for this latter period are likely 
driven by the SFAS 158 period, as discussed in Section 5.3. 
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untabulated sensitivity analysis we replace the dependent variable, Contribution, with 
Excess_Contributions, calculated as the difference between Contribution and Min_Contribution. The 
results are qualitatively similar; the coefficient on our main variable of interest, CEO_Compensation, 
continues to be significantly negative when cash flows from operations are important to CEO 
compensation.  
Second, we replicate our main analysis by replacing the dependent variable, Contribution, 
which aggregates plan-level contributions to firm-level total contributions, with a plan-level 
contribution variable. The sample includes 11,549 plan-year observations with data on 
Min_Contribution, Collective_Bargain, the denominator of Benefit_Ave, and PercRetired at the plan-
year level (all other variables are at the firm-year level). The untabulated results on our main variables 
of interest are qualitatively similar.  
Third, our main variable of interest, CEO_Compensation, is measured using the natural 
logarithm of CEO compensation. As an alternative, we scale compensation by total assets. However, 
doing this significantly skews our variable of interest and could result in greater measurement error. 
Barth et al. (1996) suggests one can mitigate the coefficient bias by including the scale variable as an 
independent variable in the model rather than as a deflator. As discussed in Appendix B, we control 
for total assets in our models. Regardless, inferences remain the same when we replace CEO 
compensation scaled by total assets instead of taking the natural logarithm. 
Fourth, to mitigate the influence of extreme values, we winsorize independent variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles and exclude observations with R-student values greater than 3. The objective 
of excluding observations with studentized residuals greater than 3 is to remove the outliers. As 
discussed in Kennedy (2003), “The rationale for looking for outliers is that they may have a strong 
influence on the estimates produced by OLS, an influence that may not be desirable (p. 373).” A 
review of the observations with large studentized residuals suggests that many of these firms’ 
contributions are large one-time payments as a result of significant changes in the firms’ economic 
conditions or retirement programs. In our opinion, these did not accurately capture the discretionary 
portion of the contribution decision. To ensure these observations are not biasing our coefficients or 
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statistical inferences, we remove them from our sample. In untabulated analyses, we winsorize 
continuous variables without excluding outliers and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
 
5. Additional Analyses 
We perform a number of additional analyses to test the robustness of our results and to gain 
additional insights. 
5.1 Cash versus Non-cash Compensation 
Prior literature has demonstrated the use of cash flows from operations in compensation 
contracts (Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin 2006; Perry and Zenner 2001; Leon 2004). Nwaeze, Yang, and Yin 
(2006) find that cash flows from operations are an important determinant of CEO cash compensation 
when the quality of earnings relative to cash flows from operations is low and when the need for cash 
flows from operations as a source of financing is high. Although prior literature has mainly examined 
the cash compensation component, our examination of proxy statements related to CEO compensation 
demonstrates that cash flows from operations are relevant in the contracting of both cash and non-cash 
compensation. In particular, we find that cash flows from operations is mentioned as a possible 
performance metric for CEO cash compensation in 41.51% of the sample firms, for which cash 
compensation data could be obtained from the proxy statements. In contrast, cash flows from 
operations is mentioned as a possible performance metric for CEO non-cash compensation in 19.70% 
of the sample firms, for which non-cash compensation data could be obtained from the proxy 
statements. In addition, for the cash compensation component, one could argue that since firms have a 
finite amount of cash available, contributing to a DB plan will result in less cash available to pay 
managements’ cash compensation. However, this alternative argument does not apply to non-cash 
compensation. 
To examine whether the negative relation between Contributions and CEO_Compensation is 
driven by CEO cash compensation, CEO non-cash compensation, or both, in an additional analysis, 
we split CEO compensation into two components: CEO_Cash_Compensation and 
CEO_Noncash_Compensation. The former is the sum of salary and bonus, and the latter includes all 
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other components of CEO compensation during the fiscal year, such as stock grants, option grants, 
and long-term incentive plan. The average CEO cash compensation is $1.69 million and average CEO 
non-cash compensation is $3.33 million (not tabulated). We then replace the total CEO compensation 
variable in the regression with the natural log transformation of these two variables and report the 
results in Table 5. We first add the two compensation components separately to the regression and 
then add them together to the regression. We perform this analysis on both sub-samples reported in 
Table 4; first splitting the sample by whether or not cash flows from operations is identified in the 
proxy statement as influencing compensation (Panel A) and then by whether the sensitivity of 
executive compensation to cash flows from operations is positive or negative (Panel B). For brevity, 
we only report the coefficients and p-values on our main variables of interest.  
As reported in Panel A, when the two components are added separately to the regression, the 
coefficient on CEO_Cash_Compensation (CEO_Noncash_Compensation) is significantly negative 
(negative) with a p-value of 0.008 (0.011) in the subsample with cash flows from operations being 
used in CEO compensation contracts. In contrast, the coefficients on the two variables, while 
negative, are insignificant or marginally significant in the subsample with cash flows from operations 
not being used in CEO compensation contracts.  When both variables are added at the same time, both 
CEO cash compensation and non-cash compensation are significantly negatively correlated with 
pension contributions (p-value = 0.025 and 0.030, respectively) in the subsample with cash flows 
from operations being used in CEO compensation contracts. The coefficients on these two variables 
are insignificant or marginally significant in the subsample with cash flows from operations not being 
used in CEO compensation contracts. In all specifications reported in Panel A, the coefficients are 
more negative in the subsample with cash flows being used in compensation contracts relative to the 
other subsample. In untabulated analyses, we further split the CEO_Cash_Compensation into the 
salary and bonus components and find that both components contribute to the negative coefficient on 
CEO_Cash_Contribution, with coefficients (p-values) of -0.071 (0.043) and -0.013 (0.011), 
respectively, for the subsample with cash flows from operations being used in CEO compensation 
contracts.  
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In Panel B, we observe similar relations between our variables of interest and Contributions. 
When added independently to our regression, we find the coefficient on CEO_Cash_Compensation 
(CEO_Noncash_Compensation) to be negative and significant (significant) with a p-value equal to 
0.007 (0.044) in the sub-sample of observations with positive CEO compensation–cash flow 
sensitivity. For the other subsample, we find the coefficient on CEO_Cash_Compensation 
(CEO_Noncash_Compensation) to be insignificant. In both regressions, we find the difference on 
coefficients to be significant. In the sub-sample with positive CEO compensation-cash flow 
sensitivity, when both variables are added to the regression, we find the coefficient on both 
CEO_Cash_Compensation and CEO_Noncash_Compensation to be negative. Both are significant or 
marginally significant with p-values of 0.012 and 0.087, respectively. Collectively, the results 
reported in Table 5 indicate that in general both cash and non-cash compensation contribute to the 
negative relation between DB plan contributions and CEO compensation.  
5.2 Does reduced pension contribution lead to higher CEO compensation 
Because prior research indicates that cash flows from operations are important for CEO 
compensation, we argue that managers have incentives to delay pension contributions in order to 
report higher cash flows from operations and ultimately to increase their compensation. The above 
results are consistent with this argument. One might question, however, whether reducing pension 
contributions indeed leads to higher CEO compensation. In this section, we use an alternative research 
design to demonstrate the link between pension contributions and CEO compensation. Specifically, 
we examine whether CEO compensation varies with both contributions and abnormal pension 
contributions, i.e., pension contributions that are not explained by the economic factors. This 
abnormal component reflects managerial discretion in pension contributions. If managers delay 
pension contributions to increase their compensation, we expect to observe a negative impact of total 
contributions and abnormal pension contributions on CEO compensation. To test this prediction, we 
estimate the following regression:  
CEO_Compensation = β0 + β1 Contributiont (Abnormal_Contributiont)  
+ β2 Firm_Sizet + β3 ROAt + β4 CFOt  
+ β5 Market_Book_Residualt + β6 Return_Residualt  
(3) 
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+ β7 N_Segmentt + εt 
 
CEO_Compensation is the natural logarithm of total CEO compensation. Contribution is measured as 
above. Abnormal_Contribution is the residual estimated from the regression of pension contributions 
on economic determinants, as specified in Equation (1). The list of independent variables for Equation 
(3) is based on prior research (e.g., Nwaeze et al. 2006; Gillan et al. 2009). Return is calculated as the 
annual stock return for the firm-year, and N_Segment is the number of segments the firm has. All 
other variables are defined as above. Because the market-to-book ratio and stock returns are highly 
correlated with the firm performance measure, we use the residuals from the respective regressions of 
the market-to-book ratio and stock returns on ROA and cash flows from operations. We do this to 
capture the impact of fundamental firm performance measures on CEO compensation.  
Table 6 reports the regression results. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the 
coefficient on Contribution (Abnormal_Contribution) is significantly negative. The impact is also 
economically significant. A one-standard deviation decrease in contributions (abnormal pension 
contributions) is associated with a 3.4% (2.4%) increase in total compensation (=exp(0.049×0.687) 
with 0.687 being the standard deviation of Contribution; and =exp(0.047x0.513) with 0. 513 being the 
standard deviation of Abnormal_Contribution). At the mean compensation levels of approximately $5 
million, this translates to an increase in annual compensation of $170,000 ($120,000).  
The coefficients on the control variables are significant in the predicted directions. CEO 
compensation is higher when firms are larger, firm performance is better, firms have higher growth 
potential (i.e., M/B is higher), and stock returns are higher. In summary, using an alternative research 
design, we confirm the findings reported above that firms that contribute less to pension plans have 
higher CEO compensation.  
5.3 Changes in pension accounting policy 
In this section, we investigate whether our results vary with the changes in accounting rules on 
DB pension plans. During our sample period, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
issued a number of accounting pronouncements relating to DB plans, resulting in a changing pension 
accounting environment. We provide a summary of the key changes under each pronouncement in 
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Appendix C. Overtime, there is an expanding requirement on disclosures related to DB plans, 
particularly under SFAS 132 and SFAS 132(R). SFAS 158 then changes the presentation in the 
financial statements and requires publicly traded companies to report the underfunded or overfunded 
pension liability/asset. Recognizing the funded status of pension plans further increases the credibility 
of the numbers (e.g., Selling and Stickney 1986; Harper et al. 1987; Aboody 1996; Davis-Friday et al. 
1999). As discussed above, contributing less to DB plans, while increasing reported cash flow, 
increases net pension liabilities. If the explicit recognition of net pension liabilities helps outsiders to 
recognize the potential adverse consequences of not contributing to DB plans, we expect to see 
weaker results on managerial incentives under SFAS 158. 
In these analyses, using the two approaches discussed above, we focus only on those 
observations where cash flows from operations are important determinants of executive 
compensation. To investigate whether the change in accounting rules affects companies’ decisions to 
contribute, we replicate the analyses separately for the period under SFAS 87/132/132(R) and the 
period under 158. We estimate Equation (2) separately for the two sub-periods. Table 7 reports the 
results, Column (1) for pre SFAS 158 period, Column (2) for the period under SFAS 158, and the last 
column for the differences between the two. Panel A presents the results in the sub-sample where cash 
flows from operations is explicitly mentioned in the proxy statement as a factor that influences 
compensation. We find that the coefficient on CEO_Compensation is significantly negative in the 
earlier period, but insignificant in the period under SFAS 158. Although the difference is not 
significant, we do find the coefficient more negative in the pre SFAS 158 regime. We find similar 
results in Panel B using the subsample of observations with positive relation between executive 
compensation and cash flows from operations. In particular, we find that the coefficient on 
CEO_Compensation is significantly negative in the earlier period and insignificant in the period under 
SFAS 158.  
Taken together, these results provide some evidence that with recognition of pension 
assets/liabilities in the financial statements under the more recent accounting regime, users of 
financial statements can better understand the funded status of the pension plans. This in turn affects 
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firms’ contribution decisions. Specifically, we find that the incentive to increase CEO compensation 
via delaying pension contributions only holds in the old accounting regimes.22 These results are 
consistent with prior literature documenting that firms alter their behavior as a result of changes in the 
disclosure environment of pension accounting (i.e. Chuk 2013; Harper and Strawser 1993).23 
Although this finding speaks to a potential benefit of the more transparent recognition of net pension 
assets/liabilities in the financial statements, we suggest the reader interpret this result with caution due 
to the small number of observations in the post SFAS 158 period. 24   
6. Conclusion 
Although there are mechanisms put in place by regulators and the PBGC to incentivize firms to 
contribute to DB plans, research highlights the flexibility management has in the contribution decision 
(Chaudhry, Yong, and Veld 2017). In this paper, we exploit this discretion and examine how 
managerial incentives affect companies’ decisions to contribute to their DB plans. Particularly, we 
investigate whether firms with higher CEO compensation contribute less to DB plans. 
We predict that managers delay contributing to a DB plan when managers can benefit from 
reporting higher cash flows from operations. Using 5,221 firm-year observations from the S&P1500 
firms in the period 1994-2007, we find that firms that contribute less to DB plans award CEOs higher 
compensation. Results are stronger when cash flows from operations are directly used as possible 
performance metrics in executive compensation contracts and when CEO compensation is more 
sensitive to cash flows from operations. This finding applies to both cash and non-cash compensation 
components.   
Overall our paper enhances our understanding of the determinants of contributing to a DB plan. 
Such understanding is important to regulators, the PBGC, investors, and employees, whose welfare is 
                                                     
22 We recognize that the classification of sub-periods based on accounting standards coincides with he Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 (PPA), which was passed around the same time as SFAS 158. We do not think this factor 
drives the above documented results, because the minimum contribution requirement under PPA is not effective 
until 2008 (Campbell et al. 2010). Thus, our sample period is not directly affected by the funding standards 
under PPA.  
23 Internationally, IAS 19 (“Employee Benefits”) is similar to SFAS 158 in that IFRS also recognizes a net 
pension asset or liability as the funded status of the plan. Thus, these results should be of interest to a broader 
international audience. Future research could explore whether the observed relations in this paper extend to 
other international settings. 
24 Future research can further explore this research question if contribution data becomes available for the later 
period. 
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linked to pension contributions. As defined benefit pension plans are prevalent in almost all developed 
countries and many developing countries, the results in this study should also be of interest to a much 
broader, international audience. Our observed negative relation between contributions and executive 
compensation suggests a wealth transfer from employees to top executives.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Variable Definition Predicted 
Relation to 
Contribution 
Contribution =  Employer contributions to firm employees’ pension 
plans, scaled by pension benefit obligations (data 286 + 
data 294) and then multiplied by 100. Employer 
contribution is based on information reported in Form 
5500.  
N/A 
Managerial incentives: 
CEO_Compensation = Natural log of CEO total compensation in the fiscal 
year. Total compensation includes CEO’s Salary, 
Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted 
Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock Options 
Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive 
Payouts, and All Other Total.  
- 
   
CEO_Cash_Compensation = Natural log of CEO total cash compensation (salary 
and bonus, in thousand dollars) in the fiscal year. In 
the Post-FAS 123R period, this variable is expanded 
to include non-equity incentives (see Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen 2014 for more information). 
- 
CEO_Noncash_Compensation 
= 
Natural log of CEO total non-cash compensation (in 
thousand dollars) in the fiscal year. Non-cash 
compensation includes Other Annual, Total Value of 
Restricted Stock Granted, Total Value of Stock 
Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term 
Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total.  
- 
   
Pension and firm characteristics: 
UnderFunding =  Prior years’ projected benefit obligation (PBO) (data 
286 + data 294) minus fair value of plan assets (data 
287 + data 296), scaled by PBO and then multiplied by 
100.  
+ 
UnderFunding_Dum =  Indicator equal to one if UnderFunding is positive, 
zero otherwise. 
+ 
Min_Contribution =  Minimum required contribution amount, scaled by 
pension benefit obligations (data 286 + data 294) and 
then multiplied by 100. Minimum required contribution 
amount is based on information reported in Form 5500.  
+ 
Collective_Bargain = Dummy variable equal to one if a collective bargaining 
agreement exists and zero otherwise. This variable is 
based on information reported in Form 5500. 
+/- 
Benefit_Ave = Projected benefit obligations (PBO) (data 286 + data 
294) scaled by total beneficiaries of the plan, which is 
based on information reported in Form 5500. 
+/- 
PercRetired = Percentage of the total plan participants that are 
receiving benefits reported in Form 5500. 
+/- 
ROA = Net income before extraordinary items (data 18) scaled 
by total assets (data 6). 
+ 
Op_CF = Operating cash flow (data308) plus pension + 
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contributions, scaled by total assets (data6). 
Inv_CF = Net cash flows received (paid) from investing activities 
from the statement of cash flows (data311), scaled by 
total assets (data6). 
+ 
Fin_CF = Net cash flows received (paid) from financing activities 
from the statement of cash flows (data313), scaled by 
total assets (data6). 
+ 
1/Interest_Coverage = Interest expense (data15), scaled by operating income 
before depreciation (data13). 
- 
Z_Score = Decile ranking of Altman’s Z-score (1980) (Z_Score) 
where lower rank values represent greater distress risk. 
+ 
MTR = Simulated marginal tax rate after interest expense has 
been deducted, as provided by John Graham. An 
imputed marginal tax rate was imputed for missing 
values based on Graham and Mills (2008). 
+ 
  
 
Control variables: 
 
Firm_ Size= Natural log of total assets (data 6) in millions. +/- 
Market_Book = Market value of assets divided by book value of assets, 
with market value of assets defined as book value of 
assets (data6) minus book value of equity (data60) minus 
deferred taxes (data7) plus market value of equity 
(data199 × data25). 
+/- 
Annual_Mkt_Ret = Returns of S&P500 index for the year. - 
Average_TBond = Average 30-year T-bond rate for the year. + 
Devpensionret = Standard deviation of fair value of pension assets (data 
287 + data 296) divided by total assets (data 6), and then 
divided by average deflated fair value of pension assets. 
This variable was calculated for two periods, 1994-2000 
and 2001-2007, where a minimum of three years of data 
was required. 
- 
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Appendix B: Economic determinants of DB plan pension contributions - Argument and variable 
measurement  
 
Plan characteristics 
Because underfunded pension plans impose risk on the PBGC and the government, the 
government establishes certain monitoring mechanisms to encourage well-funded DB plans. First, 
besides the flat-rate premium, the PBGC also charges a variable-rate premium.25 Second, Section 430 
of the Internal Revenue Code specifies the minimum funding requirement for DB plans, which is 
determined based on normal cost, amortization charges and credits, and interest. Plans that do not 
meet the minimum funding requirement are required to pay interest charges and liens.26 Third, having 
a deeply underfunded pension plan can also impose political costs on the company. For example, 
when the funding ratio (pension assets over pension obligations) is under 60%, the pension plan will 
be rated as a high-risk plan by the PBGC and will attract regulatory scrutiny (www.pbgc.gov). Lastly, 
pension obligations increase a company’s liabilities and risk. Prior research finds that unfunded 
pension obligations adversely affect the amount and cost of external financing (Carroll and Niehaus 
1998; Cardinale 2007). All these factors will induce firms with underfunded DB plans to contribute to 
their DB plans. 
The above discussions indicate that contributions to DB plans are positively correlated with the 
level of underfunding. We use three variables to capture the extent of underfunding for DB plans: 
lagged underfunding (UnderFunding), indicator variable equal to one if the DB plan is underfunded 
(zero otherwise) (UnderFunding_Dum) and minimum contribution requirement (Min_Contribution). 
UnderFunding is calculated as the difference in projected benefit obligations (PBO) and the fair value 
of plan assets at the beginning of the year, scaled by total assets. In untabulated results, we use 
accumulated benefit obligations and find similar results. Minimum contribution requirement is 
specified by the regulators and we obtain it from Form 5500.  
In addition, employees have incentives to ensure the DB plans are well-funded. Unfunded 
pension obligations are essentially borrowings from plan participants (Cooper and Ross 2002). 
Although underfunded pension plans of bankrupt firms will be rescued by the PBGC, the benefit is 
usually lower than what is guaranteed under the plan. For example, the average retiree in Delphi can 
only get about 51% to 56% of what is promised in the plan (WSJ 7/23/2009). Fully understanding 
these consequences, employees and retirees will pressure management to provide enough funding to 
the plan. The effectiveness of their monitoring depends on their negotiation power, the immediacy in 
receiving benefits, and the magnitude of their retirement benefit (thus their incentives to monitor). To 
capture employees’ negotiation power, we use a dummy variable, Collective_Bargain, to indicate 
firms with a collective bargaining agreement. We control for the immediacy in receiving benefits 
using the percentage of plan participants currently receiving benefits, PercRetired. We capture 
employees’ retirement benefits using the average retirement benefit per employee, Benefit_Ave.  
However, prior research also suggests the opposite because unfunded retirement benefits can 
serve as a bonding mechanism between the firm and its employees (Ippolito 1985). Since retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensation, leaving the firm earlier will reduce the employment 
benefits (e.g., forgoing the unvested benefits or receiving the benefit based on the current salary level, 
rather than a higher salary in the future). Francis and Reiter (1987) further argue that the benefit of 
such a bonding mechanism increases with the benefits per employee and the presence of separate 
                                                     
25 For 2013, the flat rate premium was $42 per participant for single-employer plans and the variable-rate 
premium is $9 per $1,000 of underfunding (http://www.pbgc.gov/prac/prem/premium-rates.html). However, it is 
unclear whether the premium structure is effective. Even if the company has to pay the variable rate premium, 
the cost is only 0.9%; that is, they can pay $9 to buy the opportunity of not contributing $1,000 to the pension 
plan.  
26 There is also a maximum amount of contributions to a DB plan that is tax deductible under IRS Sec. 404. It is 
(1) the amount necessary to meet the 412(a) minimum funding requirements, (2) the amount necessary to 
provide all employees the remaining unfunded cost of their past and current service credits distributed over the 
remaining future service of each such employee, or (3) an amount equal to the normal cost of the plan plus, if 
past service is provided, an amount necessary to amortize those unfunded costs over 10 years. 
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plans for unionized workers. Because of these conflicting arguments, we do not have directional 
predictions for these three variables. 
 
Firm characteristics – Opportunity cost and tax benefit of pension contributions 
As discussed above, pension contributions reduce cash available for other purposes such as 
investments and cash dividends. When a firm faces financial constraints, a dollar contributed to the 
pension plan is a dollar less available for other purposes. A firm might delay pension contributions if 
the benefit of the alternative use of cash is high, or if the cost of ignoring alternative demands for cash 
is high (Chaudhry et al. 2017). Thus pension contributions can be jointly determined with other needs 
for cash. How much to contribute to a DB plan depends upon whether the firm has enough cash to 
contribute while considering investing and financing needs. In particular, the opportunity cost of plan 
contributions is high for firms with high leverage because not paying interest or principal payments on 
debt can have immediate adverse consequences, forcing the firms to go bankrupt in the worst 
scenario. Thus, we expect that pension contributions to DB plans increase with cash flow availability 
and decrease with leverage.27 To measure the cash flow availability, we separately control for 
operating (Op_CF), investing (Inv_CF) and financing (Fin_CF) cash flows. We use interest coverage 
to capture the demand for cash arising from debt liabilities. To avoid extreme values, we define 
1/Interest_Coverage as interest expense scaled by operating income before depreciation. This 
discussion implies a positive coefficient on Op_CF, Inv_CF and Fin_CF and a negative coefficient on 
1/Interest_Coverage. In an untabulated sensitivity test, we use leverage instead of interest coverage, 
and the inferences remain the same. To control for financially constrained firms, we include the decile 
ranking of Altman’s Z-score (1980) (Z_Score) where lower rank values represent greater distress risk. 
Like interest payments, contributions to the pension plan reduce the taxes to an amount allowed by the 
IRS. 28 The tax benefit is higher for firms with higher marginal tax rates (MTR). Therefore, firms with 
a high marginal tax rate are more likely to contribute to DB plans (e.g., Thomas 1988).  
Note that if pension contributions are binding, we should not observe a systematic association 
between pension contributions and these variables. Observing the hypothesized association between 
contributions and these variables implies that the opportunity cost of pension contributions is higher 
than the benefit of pension contributions. 
 
Other determinants of pension contribution 
We include three groups of control variables in the analyses. First, we include return on assets 
(ROA) to measure a firm’s profitability, firm size (Firm_Size) and growth opportunities 
(Market_Book). More profitable, larger and/or higher growth firms may be in a better financial 
position to contribute to a DB plan. Second, we control for two macro-economic variables: annual 
market return (Annual_Mkt_Ret) and Treasury-bond rate (Average_TBond).If the market return is 
high, then the return from pension assets is higher and firms are thus less likely to contribute. On the 
other hand, companies usually use the 30-year corporate bond rate as the discount rate to calculate the 
present value of future pension obligations. Since T-bond rate is an important component of corporate 
bond rate, a higher T-bond rate will decrease the present value of future pension obligations. 
Therefore, we expect firms to contribute less when the interest rate is high. Third, companies with 
more volatile pension assets may not fully fund their pension plans because of the potential increase 
                                                     
27 Note that our analysis of the relationship between actual pension contributions and opportunity cost proxies 
(including capital availability) is different from the analysis in Rauh (2006). Rauh (2006) uses mandatory 
pension contributions, which is essentially a non-linear function of lagged funded status, as an instrument to 
study the relationship between capital expenditures and internally generated cash flows. Given our control for 
minimum contribution requirement, our analysis focuses on discretionary pension contributions and capital 
availability after investing and financing needs. In the more fundamental level, we focus on the discretion in 
pension contributions, while Rauh (2006) focuses on the mandatory component of pension contribution. 
28 In general, pension plan contributions are tax deductible (IRC §404 (1)(A)(i)-(iii)) and create a temporary 
book-tax difference. All else equal, current period contributions reduce income taxes payable and have no effect 
on income tax expense, thus creating a deferred tax liability. 
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in the fair value of pension assets. As a result, these companies do not need to fully fund their plans 
every year. We use the coefficient of variation (Devpensionret) to capture the volatility of pension 
assets and expect a negative coefficient on this variable.29 
                                                     
29 Prior research suggests another reason for the negative effect of pension asset volatility. When a DB plan is 
terminated, the PBGC takes over the pension liabilities from the firm in exchange for the value of the plan assets 
and up to 30 percent of the firm’s net worth (Bodie et al. 1987). As a result, prior research (e.g., Francis and 
Reiter 1987; Jin et al. 2006) suggests that DB plans can be regarded as a put option for the firm – sell the 
pension assets and 30% of the company’s net assets to the PBGC to satisfy the pension obligations. The option 
value theory indicates that the value of the put option increases with the volatility of the assets. Thus, companies 
have lower incentives to contribute when the volatility of the pension assets is high. 
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Appendix C: Changes in Pension Accounting Policy 
 
This appendix reviews the four accounting pronouncements relating to DB plans that were in place 
during our sample period. The discussion is based on information obtained from the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) website. Overall, the amount and type of information 
displayed to users relating to defined benefit pension plans increase over the sample period. Under all 
of these accounting pronouncements, contributions to DB plans reduce cash flows from operations 
and increase the net pension assets invested in the plan.  
SFAS 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions 
SFAS 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, issued in December 1985 and effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 15, 1986, “sought to achieve more useful financial reporting” through 
three major changes: (1) standardizing the measurement of net periodic pension costs, (2) requiring 
recognition of a liability when the accumulated benefit obligation (ABO) exceeded the fair value of 
plan assets, and (3) requiring expanding disclosures relating to the plan itself, components of pension 
costs, obligations and assets (SFAS 87).  
Specifically, under SFAS 87, net periodic pension costs included the following components: service 
cost, interest cost, actual return on plan assets, amortization of unrecognized prior service cost, 
recognized gains or losses, and amortization of the unrecognized gains or losses at the date of initial 
application of this Statement. These items determine the amount of pension expense recognized for 
the period. Note that pension contributions do not directly influence components of pension expense 
for the period. 
Relating to the recognition of assets and liabilities, companies are required to recognize a liability 
(unfunded accrued pension cost) if net periodic pension cost exceeds the cash contribution to the plan 
and an asset (prepaid pension cost) if net periodic pension cost is less than the contribution. In 
addition, if the ABO exceeds the fair market value of the plan assets, companies are required to 
recognize a liability (including the unfunded accrued pension cost) at least equal to the unfunded 
ABO, but an asset is not to be recorded if the fair value of the plan assets exceeds the amount of the 
ABO. 
Under SFAS 87, companies are required to disclose the following information: description of the 
plan, components of the net period pension cost, a schedule reconciling the funded status of the plan, 
the discount rate and rate of compensation increase used to measure the pension benefit obligation 
(PBO) and rate of return on plan assets, and the amounts and types of securities in plan assets. 
SFAS 132, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits  
SFAS 132 became effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. SFAS 132 did not 
change the measurement of DB plans in the financial statements, but it increased the disclosure of DB 
plan information in the footnotes to the financial statements. More specifically, SFAS 132 required 
(1) a detailed reconciliation of changes in the benefit obligation and plan assets, (2) separate 
disclosure of unamortized prior period service costs and unrecognized gains or losses, (3) disclosure 
of the intangible asset and the amount included in accumulated other comprehensive income relating 
to the required additional minimum liability, and (4) modified disclosure of the net periodic pension 
cost components. Unlike other preannouncements during the sample period, SFAS 132 does not 
require disclosure of the ABO.  
SFAS 132(Revised) 
Effective for financial statements with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2003, SFAS 132(R) 
was issued in response to concerns expressed by users about the need for more information about 
economic resources and obligations relating to pension plans. While maintaining the measurement of 
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DB plans in the financial statements, SFAS 132(R), expanded the disclosure requirements on the 
assets, obligations, cash flows, and net periodic benefit cost of DB plans. Under SFAS 132(R), firms 
must disclose the types of plan assets (debt, equity, real estate, etc.) invested in, investment strategy of 
the firm including a target allocation percentage and the assumptions about the expected long-term 
rate of return on plan assets. SFAS 132(R) also requires firms disclose the measurement dates of 
pension assets and obligations, pension benefits to be paid over the next five years, discount rate used 
to calculate pension obligations, and components of net periodic benefit costs recognized during 
interim periods. Under SFAS 132(R), firms must also disclose both PBO and ABO. Carpenter and 
Mahoney (2004) suggest that these disclosures can help users to assess whether expected benefits 
payments are adequately funded.  
SFAS 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans 
The most important change from previous pronouncements under SFAS 158 is the recognition of 
pension assets/liabilities on the financial statements. Pension expense is recorded similarly as under 
SFAS 87. Entities with fiscal years ending after December 15, 2006 were required to apply these four 
major changes under SFAS 158:  
1. Recognize the funded status of a benefit plan – measured as the difference between plan 
assets at fair value and the projected benefit obligations - in the statement of financial 
position. (Prior pronouncements allowed employers to delay recognition of economic events 
which would often result in liabilities less than the underfunded status of the plan and 
sometimes even result in recognition of assets for underfunded plans.) 
2. Recognize as a component of other comprehensive income, net of tax, the gains or losses and 
prior service costs or credits that arise during the period but are not recognized as components 
of net periodic benefit cost pursuant to FASB Statement No. 87. 
3. Measure defined benefit plan assets and obligations as of the date of the employer’s fiscal 
year-end statement of financial position (with limited exceptions). 
4. Disclose in the notes to financial statements additional information about certain effects on 
net periodic benefit cost for the next fiscal year that arise from delayed recognition of the 
gains or losses, prior service costs or credits, and transition asset or obligation. 
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Table 1 Sample selection and composition 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Restriction  Sample size 
 
Firm-years with basic pension data from Compustat for S&P1500 firms 
in the period 1994-2007  
 
12,147 
 
Less:   
   
Observations without data in the form 5500 CRR database 4,954  
   
Observations with missing data from Compustat 1,428  
 
Observations with missing data from Execucomp  544  
   
Final sample  5,221 
 
Panel B: Yearly distribution 
Year Frequency Percentage 
      
1994 276 5.29 
1995 299 5.73 
1996 370 7.09 
1997 476 9.12 
1998 467 8.94 
1999 346 6.63 
2000 279 5.34 
2001 314 6.01 
2002 376 7.20 
2003 418 8.01 
2004 426 8.16 
2005 389 7.45 
2006 400 7.66 
2007 385 7.37 
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Table 1 (cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Fama and French industry classification 
  Sample   S&P 1500 index in 2006 
  Frequency Percentage   Frequency Percentage 
Aircraft 89 1.70  
11 0.73 
Apparel 84 1.61  
24 1.60 
Automobiles and Trucks 154 2.95  
21 1.40 
Beer and Liquor 54 1.03  
6 0.40 
Business Services 153 2.93  
133 8.87 
Business Supplies 251 4.81  
26 1.73 
Chemicals 389 7.45  
34 2.27 
Communication 141 2.70  
25 1.67 
Computers 91 1.74  
45 3.00 
Construction 10 0.19  
24 1.60 
Construction Materials 187 3.58  
23 1.53 
Consumer Goods 162 3.10  
24 1.60 
Electrical Equipment 88 1.69  
13 0.87 
Electronic Equipment 161 3.08  
99 6.60 
Food Products 203 3.89  
28 1.87 
Healthcare 13 0.25  
29 1.93 
Insurance 9 0.17  
73 4.87 
Machinery 347 6.65  
51 3.40 
Measuring and Control Equip 100 1.92  
33 2.20 
Medical Equipment 111 2.13  
40 2.67 
Miscellaneous 14 0.27  
17 1.13 
Personal Services 64 1.23  
16 1.07 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 278 5.32  
54 3.60 
Pharmaceutical Products 170 3.26  
57 3.80 
Printing and Publishing 127 2.43  
14 0.93 
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 59 1.13  
29 1.93 
Retail 249 4.77  
103 6.87 
Rubber and Plastic Products 75 1.44  
7 0.47 
Shipping Containers 60 1.15  
5 0.33 
Steel Works, Etc. 162 3.10  
21 1.40 
Textiles 59 1.13  
4 0.27 
Trading 4 0.08  
75 5.00 
Transportation 137 2.62  
38 2.53 
Utilities 522 10.00  
86 5.73 
Wholesale 169 3.24  
51 3.40 
Other Industries* 275 5.26   161 10.73 
 
This table describes the sample selection process and the composition of our sample firms.  
* This category includes industries in which both our sample and the 2006 S&P 1500 index have one percent or 
less of the observations.  
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable n Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
Contribution 5,221 0.407 0.913 0.000 0.064 0.469 
CEO_Compensation 5,221 7.977 1.013 7.244 7.953 8.683 
UnderFunding 5,221 0.699 5.565 -0.846 0.746 2.860 
UnderFunding_Dum 5,221 0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Min_Contribution 5,221 0.539 0.629 0.134 0.339 0.701 
Collective_Bargain 5,221 0.463 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Benefit_Ave 5,221 0.143 0.430 0.027 0.051 0.094 
PercRetired 5,221 0.492 0.210 0.348 0.487 0.629 
Op_CF 5,221 0.104 0.064 0.065 0.100 0.139 
Inv_CF 5,221 -0.074 0.081 -0.107 -0.064 -0.032 
Fin_CF 5,221 -0.023 0.087 -0.066 -0.025 0.014 
1/Interest_Coverage 5,221 0.188 0.208 0.072 0.130 0.225 
Z_Score 5,221 5.535 2.855 3.000 6.000 8.000 
MTR 5,221 0.254 0.137 0.133 0.347 0.350 
ROA 5,221 0.048 0.058 0.024 0.048 0.077 
Firm_Size 5,221 7.886 1.417 6.813 7.764 8.862 
Market_Book 5,221 1.688 0.820 1.150 1.420 1.928 
Annual_Mkt_Ret 5,221 0.111 0.165 0.030 0.136 0.264 
Average_Tbond 5,221 5.287 0.940 4.544 5.018 6.273 
Devpensionret 5,221 0.239 0.175 0.128 0.190 0.288 
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Table 2 (cont’d)  
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix  
  
(1) 
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Contribution 
(2) CEO_Compensation -0.009 
        
(3) UnderFunding 0.372 0.057 
       
(4) UnderFunding_Dum 0.239 0.073 0.635 
      
(5) Min_Contribution 0.473 -0.064 0.293 0.144 
     
(6) Collective_Bargain 0.007 0.002 -0.109 -0.128 0.076 
    
(7) Benefit_Ave -0.080 0.148 0.008 -0.023 -0.156 -0.013 
   
(8) PercRetired 0.024 0.191 0.077 0.032 0.046 0.030 0.071 
  
(9) Op_CF 0.116 0.170 -0.010 -0.001 0.059 -0.039 0.015 -0.148 
 
(10) Inv_CF 0.102 0.002 0.092 0.063 0.107 0.021 0.009 0.185 -0.233 
(11) Fin_CF -0.080 -0.103 -0.022 -0.020 -0.100 -0.001 -0.026 -0.060 -0.432 
(12) 1/Interest_Coverage -0.031 -0.179 0.063 0.028 -0.016 -0.015 -0.006 0.148 -0.458 
(13) Z_Score 0.105 0.148 -0.002 0.025 0.111 -0.044 -0.030 -0.143 0.494 
(14) MTR -0.028 0.055 -0.096 -0.070 -0.030 0.006 0.025 -0.103 0.188 
(15) ROA 0.018 0.216 -0.059 -0.011 0.002 -0.011 0.012 -0.125 0.573 
(16) Firm_Size -0.058 0.707 -0.018 -0.020 -0.129 0.102 0.236 0.151 0.011 
(17) Market_Book 0.054 0.327 0.014 0.006 0.041 -0.064 0.043 -0.086 0.542 
(18) Annual_Mkt_Ret -0.037 -0.143 0.027 -0.021 0.053 0.056 -0.034 -0.113 -0.006 
(19) Average_Tbond -0.142 -0.320 -0.289 -0.294 -0.019 0.141 0.003 -0.279 0.014 
(20) Devpensionret -0.006 -0.097 0.027 0.083 -0.047 -0.051 -0.054 -0.048 -0.080 
 
  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) 
(10) Inv_CF 
          
(11) Fin_CF -0.647 
         
(12) 1/Interest_Coverage 0.230 0.091 
        
(13) Z_Score -0.049 -0.284 -0.602 
       
(14) MTR -0.096 -0.048 -0.301 0.176 
      
(15) ROA -0.144 -0.259 -0.635 0.620 0.290 
     
(16) Firm_Size 0.032 -0.031 -0.047 -0.126 0.055 0.045 
    
(17) Market_Book -0.093 -0.288 -0.340 0.623 0.136 0.608 0.085 
   
(18) Annual_Mkt_Ret -0.054 0.038 -0.043 0.079 0.055 0.064 -0.106 0.064 
  
(19) Average_Tbond -0.127 0.066 -0.051 0.063 0.070 0.057 -0.240 0.004 0.277 
 
(20) Devpensionret 0.032 0.018 0.203 -0.108 -0.105 -0.146 -0.139 -0.036 0.044 0.068 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics on variables used in the regression analyses (Panel A) and the correlation matrix 
(Panel B). Correlations with p-values less than or equal to 0.05 are in bold. See Appendix A for variable measurements.
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Table 3 Determinants of Pension Contributions 
 
Variable Pred. Sign (1) (2) 
CEO_Compensation  - 
 
-0.023** 
   
(0.028) 
UnderFunding + 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
UnderFunding_Dum + 0.091*** 0.093*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Min_Contrib + 0.463*** 0.463*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Collective_Bargain +/- 0.000 -0.001 
  
(0.999) (0.931) 
Benefit_Ave +/- -0.045*** -0.046*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
PercRetired +/- -0.131*** -0.125*** 
  
(0.002) (0.003) 
Op_CF + 2.272*** 2.276*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Inv_CF + 1.360*** 1.353*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Fin_CF + 1.356*** 1.376*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
1/Interest_Coverage - -0.055 -0.056 
  
(0.164) (0.159) 
Z_Score + 0.021*** 0.021*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
MTR + 0.015 0.025 
  
(0.404) (0.339) 
ROA + -0.418 -0.405 
  
(0.973) (0.969) 
Firm_Size + 0.014** 0.026*** 
  
(0.019) (0.002) 
Market_Book + -0.016 -0.009 
  
(0.835) (0.706) 
Annual_Mkt_Ret - -0.170* -0.187* 
  
(0.083) (0.063) 
Average_Tbond - 0.024 0.022 
  
(0.745) (0.727) 
Devpensionret - 0.033 0.033 
  
(0.777) (0.777) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
n 
 
5,154 5,153 
Adj. R2   45.00% 45.10% 
This table reports results from regressions of defined benefit plan pension contributions on its determinants, as specified 
in Equations (1) and (2). We exclude observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. P-values are calculated 
based on firm clustering adjusted standard errors. One-sided p-values are reported in parentheses for variables with 
predicted signs; otherwise two-sided p-values are reported. See Appendix A for variable measurements. 
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Table 4 Determinants of DB pension contributions: 
CEO compensation linked to cash flows from operations 
Panel A: Cash Flows from Operations Being Used in CEO Compensation Contracts 
  
Predicted 
Sign 
Subsample with Cash 
Flows from Operations 
Being Used in CEO 
Compensation Contracts 
Subsample with Cash 
Flows from Operations 
not Being Used in CEO 
Compensation Contracts 
Difference 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
CEO_Compensation  - -0.069*** -0.030** -0.039* 
  
(0.002) (0.042) (0.088) 
UnderFunding + 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.002 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.744) 
UnderFunding_Dum + 0.087** 0.061* 0.026 
  
(0.013) (0.089) (0.664) 
Min_Contribution + 0.424*** 0.538*** -0.114 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.257) 
Collective_Bargain +/- 0.026 -0.038 0.064 
  
(0.428) (0.166) (0.143) 
Benefit_Ave +/- -0.039* -0.023 -0.016 
  
(0.077) (0.272) (0.583) 
PercRetired +/- -0.208*** -0.036 -0.172 
  
(0.007) (0.670) (0.126) 
Op_CF + 3.583*** 1.326*** 2.257*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inv_CF + 2.064*** 0.793*** 1.271*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Fin_CF + 2.027*** 0.718*** 1.309*** 
  
(0.000) (0.010) (0.008) 
1/Interest_Coverage - -0.066 0.160 -0.226 
  
(0.280) (0.837) (0.225) 
Z_Score + 0.022*** 0.040** -0.018 
  
(0.007) (0.014) (0.351) 
MTR + 0.053 -0.070 0.123 
  
(0.305) (0.815) (0.355) 
ROA + -0.470 -0.437 -0.033 
  
(0.910) (0.907) (0.945) 
Firm_Size + 0.064*** 0.012 0.052*** 
  
(0.000) (0.131) (0.005) 
Market_Book + -0.022 -0.002 -0.020 
  
(0.767) (0.539) (0.552) 
Annual_Mkt_Ret - -0.540** 0.451 -0.991 
  
(0.037) (0.813) (0.130) 
Average_Tbond - -0.096 0.090 -0.186 
  
(0.196) (0.837) (0.217) 
Devpensionret - 0.089 0.112 -0.023 
  
(0.840) (0.902) (0.850) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
1,508 3,343 
 
Adj. R2   47.60% 31.00%   
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
Panel B: Compensation Cash Flow Sensitivity 
  Predicted Sign 
Observations with positive CEO 
compensation – cash flow 
sensitivity  
Other observations Difference 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
CEO_Compensation  - -0.048*** 0.002 -0.050** 
  
(0.004) (0.545) (0.022) 
UnderFunding + 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.005 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.378) 
UnderFunding_Dum + 0.073*** 0.087*** -0.014 
  
(0.004) (0.002) (0.728) 
Min_Contribution + 0.454*** 0.472*** -0.018 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.720) 
Collective_Bargain +/- -0.011 0.011 -0.022 
  
(0.610) (0.701) (0.536) 
Benefit_Ave +/- -0.050*** -0.041** -0.009 
  
(0.001) (0.019) (0.720) 
PercRetired +/- -0.024 -0.152** 0.128 
  
(0.685) (0.023) (0.150) 
Op_CF + 2.239*** 2.256*** -0.017 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.975) 
Inv_CF + 1.276*** 1.337*** -0.061 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.887) 
Fin_CF + 1.069*** 1.444*** -0.375 
  
(0.001) (0.000) (0.407) 
1/Interest_Coverage - 0.030 -0.147** 0.177 
  
(0.647) (0.023) (0.103) 
Z_Score + 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.002 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.811) 
MTR + 0.062 -0.055 0.117 
  
(0.249) (0.743) (0.346) 
ROA + 0.103 -0.816 0.919** 
  
(0.369) (0.991) (0.046) 
Firm_Size + 0.025** 0.032*** -0.007 
  
(0.023) (0.010) (0.722) 
Market_Book + -0.010 0.003 -0.013 
  
(0.673) (0.444) (0.683) 
Annual_Mkt_Ret - -0.182 -0.074 -0.108 
  
(0.146) (0.337) (0.662) 
Average_Tbond - -0.039 0.093 -0.132 
  
(0.293) (0.948) (0.150) 
Devpensionret - 0.035 0.017 0.018 
  
(0.707) (0.589) (0.858) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
2,691 2,173 
 
Adj. R2   42.90% 44.90%   
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Table 4 (cont’d) 
 
Panel A reports results from regressions of defined benefit plan pension contributions on the determinants, separately 
for (1) firm-year observations for which cash flows from operations are used in CEO compensation contracts and (2) 
other observations. Panel B reports results from regressions of defined benefit plan pension contributions on the 
determinants, separately for (1) observations for which the association between the percentage change in 
CEO_Compensation and the percentage change in cash flows from operations (referred to as CEO compensation – cash 
flow sensitivity) is positive, controlling for the percentage change in income before extraordinary items and the 
percentage change in stock returns, and (2) other observations. We include year and industry dummies to control for 
year- and industry-fixed effects. We exclude observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. P-values are 
calculated based on firm-clustered adjusted standard errors. The differences in the coefficients between columns (1) and 
(2) are reported in the last columns. One-sided p-values are reported in parentheses for variables with predicted signs in 
columns (1) and (2); otherwise, two-sided p-values are reported. See Appendix A for variable measurement. 
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Table 5 Determinants of DB pension contributions:  
Cash vs. non-cash compensation 
 
Panel A: Cash Flow from Operations Being Used in CEO Compensation Contracts 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign 
Subsample with 
Cash Flows from 
Operations Being 
Used in CEO 
Compensation 
Contracts 
All 
Others 
Diff. 
Subsample with 
Cash Flows from 
Operations Being 
Used in CEO 
Compensation 
Contracts 
All 
Others 
Diff. 
Subsample with 
Cash Flows from 
Operations Being 
Used in CEO 
Compensation 
Contracts 
All 
Others 
Diff. 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) (3) (4) (3) – (4) (5) (6) (5) – (6) 
           
CEO_Cash_Compensation - -0.075*** -0.021 -0.054* 
  
-0.060** -0.014 -0.046 
  
(0.008) (0.131) (0.065) 
  
(0.025) (0.233) (0.103) 
CEO_Noncash_Compensation - 
   
-0.026** -0.011* -0.015 -0.021** -0.010* -0.011 
     
(0.011) (0.075) (0.130) (0.030) (0.097) (0.208) 
           
Controls Included 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Firm-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
1,511 3,342 
 
1,510 3,344 
 
1,510 3,343 
 
Adj. R
2
   46.80% 31.10%   47.00% 30.70%   47.40% 31.00%   
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Table 5 (cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Compensation Cash Flow Sensitivity  
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign 
Observations 
with positive 
CEO 
compensation – 
cash flow 
sensitivity  
All 
Others 
Diff. 
Observations 
with positive 
CEO 
compensation – 
cash flow 
sensitivity  
All 
Others 
Diff. 
Observations 
with positive 
CEO 
compensation – 
cash flow 
sensitivity  
All 
Others 
Diff. 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) (3) (4) (3) – (4) (5) (6) (5) – (6) 
           
CEO_Cash_Compensation - -0.057*** 0.008 -0.065** 
  
-0.052** 0.006 -0.058* 
  
(0.007) (0.380) (0.032) 
  
(0.012) (0.587) (0.052) 
CEO_Noncash_Compensation - 
   
-0.012** 0.003 -0.015* -0.010* 0.003 -0.013* 
     
(0.044) (0.302) (0.053) (0.087) (0.677) (0.095) 
           
Controls Included 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Firm-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
2,691 2,173 
 
2,691 2,173 
 
2,691 2,173 
 
Adj. R
2
   42.90% 44.90%   42.80% 44.90%   42.90% 44.90%   
 
This table reports results from regressions of defined benefit plan pension contributions on the determinants, as specified in Equation (2), with CEO_Compensation 
being replaced with CEO_Cash_Compensation and CEO_Noncash_Compensation. We exclude observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. P-values are 
calculated based on firm-clustering adjusted standard errors. One-sided p-values are reported in parentheses for variables with predicted signs; otherwise two-sided p-
values are reported. See Appendix A for variable measurements.
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Table 6 Abnormal pension contributions and CEO compensation 
 
  Pred. Sign CEO_Compensation CEO_Compensation 
Contributions - -0.049*** 
 
  
(0.002) 
 
Abnormal_Contribution  - 
 
-0.047*** 
   
(0.007) 
Firm_Size + 0.468*** 0.469*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
ROA + 2.209*** 2.205*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
CFO + 0.552** 0.471** 
  
(0.014) (0.032) 
Market_Book Residual + 0.205*** 0.204*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
Return Residual + 0.150*** 0.148*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) 
N_Segment + 0.007 0.006 
  
(0.215) (0.253) 
    
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects 
  
Yes Yes 
n 
 
4,653 4,655 
Adj. R2   67.00% 66.80% 
 
This table reports results from regressions of CEO’s total compensation on contributions and abnormal 
contributions and other determinants. We exclude observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. P-
values are calculated based on firm-clustering adjusted standard errors. One-sided p-values are reported in 
parentheses for variables with predicted signs; otherwise two-sided p-values are reported. Variable definitions 
are as follows: Contributions = Employer contributions to firm employees’ pension plans, scaled by total assets 
(data 6) and then multiplied by 100; Abnormal_Contributions = Residual from the main regression of 
contributions on determinants specified in Equation (1); Firm_Size = Natural log of total sales (data 12) in 
millions; ROA = Net income before extraordinary items (data 18) scaled by total assets (data 6); CFO = Net 
cash flows from operating activities (data 308) divided by total assets; Market_Book Residual = Residuals from 
a regression of the market-to-book ratio (market value of assets divided by book values of assets) on CFO and 
ROA; Return Residual = Residuals from a regression of the firm’s annual return for the year on CFO and ROA; 
N_Segment = Number of SIC industry codes the firm operates in. Please see Appendix A for measurement of 
CEO compensation. All independent variables are measured contemporaneously.  
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Table 7 Determinants of DB pension contributions:  
Different pension accounting regimes 
 
Panel A: Cash Flows from Operations Being Used in CEO Compensation Contracts 
  Predicted Sign Pre SFAS 158 Post SFAS 158 Difference 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
CEO_Compensation  - -0.056** -0.004 -0.052 
  
(0.037) (0.479) (0.236) 
UnderFunding + 0.035*** 0.044*** -0.009 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.453) 
UnderFunding_Dum + 0.037 -0.054 0.091 
  
(0.252) (0.289) (0.400) 
Min_Contribution + 0.522*** 0.336*** 0.186 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.136) 
Collective_Bargain +/- -0.005 0.036 -0.041 
  
(0.925) (0.599) (0.639) 
Benefit_Ave +/- -0.031 -0.043 0.012 
  
(0.271) (0.412) (0.823) 
PercRetired +/- -0.171* -0.122 -0.049 
  
(0.075) (0.510) (0.797) 
Op_CF + 6.165*** 2.658*** 3.507** 
  
(0.000) (0.007) (0.043) 
Inv_CF + 3.675*** 1.507** 2.168* 
  
(0.000) (0.017) (0.053) 
Fin_CF + 3.625*** 1.146* 2.479** 
  
(0.000) (0.069) (0.032) 
1/Interest_Coverage - -0.035 0.268 -0.303 
  
(0.406) (0.787) (0.380) 
Z_Score + 0.026** 0.045** -0.019 
  
(0.029) (0.034) (0.472) 
MTR + -0.102 -0.006 -0.096 
  
(0.688) (0.510) (0.779) 
ROA + -0.122 0.082 -0.204 
  
(0.601) (0.480) (0.898) 
Firm_Size + 0.073*** 0.006 0.067 
  
(0.000) (0.467) (0.118) 
Market_Book + -0.059 -0.076 0.017 
  
(0.914) (0.831) (0.845) 
Annual_Mkt_Ret - -0.026 1.554 -1.58 
  
(0.970) (0.332) (0.355) 
Average_Tbond - -0.581** -0.683 0.102 
  
(0.027) (0.250) (0.919) 
Devpensionret - 0.175 -0.124 0.299* 
  
(0.942) (0.187) (0.073) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
1,079 300 
 
Adj. R2   42.20% 45.80%   
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Table 7 (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Compensation Cash Flows Sensitivity 
  Predicted Sign Pre SFAS 158 Post SFAS 158 Difference 
    (1) (2) (1) – (2) 
CEO_Compensation  - -0.061*** 0.003 -0.064 
  
(0.005) (0.517) (0.191) 
UnderFunding + 0.039*** 0.057*** -0.018 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.229) 
UnderFunding_Dum + 0.030 -0.244** 0.274** 
  
(0.208) (0.978) (0.017) 
Min_Contribution + 0.555*** 0.365*** 0.190* 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.093) 
Collective_Bargain +/- 0.020 0.031 -0.011 
  
(0.611) (0.682) (0.893) 
Benefit_Ave +/- -0.035* -0.002 -0.033 
  
(0.097) (0.963) (0.487) 
PercRetired +/- 0.102 -0.006 0.108 
  
(0.149) (0.973) (0.521) 
Op_CF + 4.142*** 3.040*** 1.102 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.402) 
Inv_CF + 2.497*** 1.790*** 0.707 
  
(0.001) (0.010) (0.493) 
Fin_CF + 2.404*** 1.189** 1.215 
  
(0.001) (0.048) (0.246) 
1/Interest_Coverage - 0.132 -0.308 0.44 
  
(0.815) (0.174) (0.225) 
Z_Score + 0.025*** 0.020 0.005 
  
(0.009) (0.185) (0.856) 
MTR + -0.153 -0.239 0.086 
  
(0.816) (0.810) (0.784) 
ROA + -0.054 -0.550 0.496 
  
(0.455) (0.645) (0.725) 
Firm_Size + 0.035** -0.046 0.081* 
  
(0.016) (0.831) (0.093) 
Market_Book + -0.017 -0.075 0.058 
  
(0.298) (0.802) (0.554) 
Annual_Mkt_Ret - 0.041 -1.074 1.115 
  
(0.550) (0.737) (0.510) 
Average_Tbond - 0.002 0.453 -0.451 
  
(0.512) (0.654) (0.675) 
Devpensionret - 0.030 0.121 -0.091 
  
(0.626) (0.744) (0.638) 
Industry-fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes 
 
n 
 
2,153 392 
 Adj. R2   34.90% 41.50%   
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Table 7 (Cont’d) 
 
This table reports results from regressions of defined benefit plan pension contributions on the determinants 
separately for different accounting regimes. SFAS 158 became effective for financial statements with fiscal 
years ending after December 15, 2006 and required recognition of the net funding status of DB plans in the 
balance sheet. Therefore, columns (1) include firm-year observations with fiscal year ends on or before 
December 15, 2006 and columns (2) include firm-year observations with fiscal year ends after December 15, 
2006. We include year and industry dummies to control for year- and industry-fixed effects. We exclude 
observations with studentized residuals greater than 3. P-values are calculated based on firm-clustering adjusted 
standard errors. One-sided p-values are reported in parentheses for variables with predicted signs in columns (1) 
and (2); otherwise two-sided p-values are reported. The differences in the coefficients between the first two 
columns, along with their p-values, are reported in the last columns. See Appendix A for variable measurement.  
 
 
